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PARALLEL MARKETS,  PRICE THEORY, AND CHINA'S GRAIN POLICY
by
James  P. Houck
Introduction
Every single day,  China's  grain policy directly touches  the lives  of
more than one billion people.  It is perhaps  the most crucial single
agricultural and food policy package  in the world.  About 60%  of all
cropland in China is devoted to  food grains,  mainly wheat and rice.
Moreover, over 40% of China's direct per capita consumption of food  (by
weight)  is  in grains.  Since about half of all household expenditures are
for  food,  grain policy is  a keystone of daily life  in China.
Economists trained in the Western neoclassical tradition need to
understand the basics of this policy in terms that are  familiar to  them.
That is  the central  goal of this paper.  Another related,  but more general,
aim is  to  examine how government controls and free markets may operate in
parallel fashion.  In particular, we will show how Chinese grain policy,
both before and after the recent economic  reforms, may be visualized within
the context of the  familiar concepts of partial equilibrium demand and
supply theory.
Naturally,  the historical and political richness  of China's
agricultural policy evolution is submerged in this purely economic
approach.  Yet anyone with even a modest appreciation of post World War II
China can interpolate at least some of that nation's social and politicalmilieu between the lines  of this  discussion.  In addition,  several general
discussions  (in English) of the  data,  institutions,  operational aspects,
and social setting of Chinese grain policies in recent times have been
published, including articles by An Xi-Ji, Calkins,  Crook, Tuan, Watson,
and Yan Rui-Zhen.
The ensuing analytical discussion will rely upon the presumption that
the following familiar theoretical propositions are applicable in China:
1.  The aggregate demand for food grain can be viewed as a negatively
sloped schedule of  the  total quantities demanded by non-farm consumers
at various prices which they might face, holding other things constant
including other prices,  incomes,  tastes,  and economic policies and
programs.
2.  A positively sloped function can be drawn as an aggregate measure of
the marginal input cost to  the Chinese agriculture for each additional
unit of grain produced beyond the farm household subsistence demand,
other prices, costs,  and technology held constant.  At least part of
this function can be viewed as  an aggregate supply curve for  food
grain.
In addition, we will assume for simplicity of  exposition that imports
or exports of  food grains are very small or non-existent and that large
year-to-year  inventory acquisitions or disposals by the government do not
occur.  These two assumptions can be relaxed quite  readily once  the main
lines of our argument are described.  Our discussion also will  imply that
the vastness  of China can be regarded as  a single market for grain.  This
is  a considerable simplification of reality but, in this context,  a useful
one since national grain policy is pervasive and evident in all  locations.
2Before 1978/79
The ba'sics  of the food grain policy before the economic reforms of
1978/79 can be described simply as full state control of grain acquisition
from farmers and its consequent distribution to non-farm consumers.
Mandatory delivery quotas and fixed delivery prices  characterized the farm
sector.  Strict rationing and state pricing were  in force at retail.
Virtually all grain handling and distribution was  in government hands.
Private or parallel marketing was essentially illegal.
Using figure 1, consider how a policy like this  might be viewed
through the lens of static partial equilibrium theory.  Let us  regard SS  as
a measure of the marginal cost to  Chinese agriculture for each additional
unit of grain produced beyond subsistence consumption by farm households.
The  schedule DD  is  the non-farm demand function for food grains,  measured
at  the farm level.  It can be viewed as  the usual, partial equilibrium
derived demand curve for grain,  considering the non-farm retail demand as
the primary demand locus.
Any official  government demand for grain beyond that obtained through
mandatory contract procurement is  included in DD.  (This element of demand
is  important  in the parallel market cases  to  follow.)  We use the  derived
demand formation in order to  focus both demand and supply considerations at
the farm level,  recognizing that other costs and economic  functions are
involved in processing and moving grain from rural  to urban areas.
In this case,  the government's behavior as the sole  intermediary can
be illustrated rather simply.  It procures a given amount of grain from
farmers by mandatory delivery quotas enforced by coercive power vested in









The pre-reform grain market
4or  transfers are permitted.  Subject to the vagaries of weather and pests,
this amount  is Q in figure 1.  The marginal cost of this output is
indicated as Oc.  However,  farmers may or may not be reimbursed this per-
unit amount by the state.  Theoretically,  it could be more, or it could be
less.  It is plausible to  think of it as less--perhaps Ob.  Then the
shaded area A can be viewed as an implicit production tax on agriculture.
A
(If Ob were above Oc, then an implicit state production subsidy on Q would
be  involved.)
Now consider the government's retail distribution policy.  It has the
A
volume Q to disperse.  If that amount were sold at whatever the market
would bear, then price Oe would result.  However, the pre-reform grain
distribution system was  (and still is)  characterized by low, official
retail purchase prices and a quantity rationing scheme based upon coupons
issued to consumers  on administratively determined grounds.  Rationing
based on queuing by consumers is not the basic model  in the Chinese context
although some elements  of it  are present.  A recent article by Alexeev
analyzes some aspects  of rationing and pricing based on queuing with
specific application to  the Soviet Union.  In China, ration coupons
traditionally have been issued to  consumers based on individual
characteristics  such as age,  occupation, gender,  residence,  etc.
Assume  that the state-established retail equivalent price is  Oa in
figure 1.  The amount demanded in an open market at this low price would
A  A
be Oh, but only Q is available.  The amount Qh represents the excess,  and
unfulfilled, demand at  the price  of Oa.  In this setting, each ration
coupon carries an implicit per unit value of ae,  the difference between the
A
demand price for Q and the state controlled retail price.
5Area B in this case is  the monetary value of the consumer subsidy that
would appear in the government's budget,  given these price decisions.  It
is  the difference between the price paid to farmers and the price received
A
from consumers on the volume Q.  It might be either larger or smaller than
area A, the  implicit production tax.
A
In the  figure 1 illustration, Q  is arbitrarily shown to  be less than
the volume  that would be produced under fully open,  free markets  (where SS
and DD intersect) but more than the amount that would be freely supplied at
the low, controlled retail price equivalent.  Although, this  is probably a
realistic illustration, other possibilities exist and can be examined
within this basic  framework.
For  instance, Q could be established at volumes to  the right of point
j--even beyond Oh.  In this  case, with farm price at Ob and consumption
price at Oa,  the government would be exploiting both farmers and consumers
in order to achieve an output target beyond internal consumption demands.
It could also be  that the amount secured from farmers by government fiat
(Q)  might exceed or  fall short of the amount distributed at retail.
Exports  or stockpiling might motivate procurements  in excess  of retail
distributions,  while imports  or stock draw-downs might be occur if farm
procurement were  less  than consumption.
In this fully controlled system, prices,  as set by the authorities,
allocate neither production resources  or consumption expenditures.  They
are basically accounting measures which assign costs  to buyers and returns
to  farmers for this crucial  staple commodity within the  society.
6After 1978/79
As the economic reforms  in China's  food and agricultural policy were
introduced during and after 1978/79, several important aspects of the old
system remained in place.  However, numerous innovations and relaxations
emerged across  the entire system, including even the rather conservative
grains policy.  Important elements of the old grain policy still remained
in place including  (1)  mandatory delivery quotas of grain levied against
farm households and acquired at relatively low,  government-determined
prices and (2) the continued operation of a coupon-based rationing system
for urban sales at low consumption prices.
One major  innovation was  the rapid development of a legal,  reasonably
open, free market for food grains in which producers, merchants  and,
consumers may participate as private  agents.  An important  feature of this
new, parallel marketing system is  that the government itself now purchases
grain supplies  (beyond mandatory quota volumes)  essentially in competition
with the higher-priced free market.
Another major change from the pre-reform era  is a significant increase
in the decision making freedom allotted to farm households.  Under  the
Household Responsibility System,  once mandatory grain delivery quotas are
filled at the official procurement price,  the household may sell additional
grain to the open market or to  the government,  at typically higher prices.
In addition,  it may produce and sell other agricultural commodities,  and/or
offer household labor and capital to non-farm enterprises.  This  system now
allows prices  to  signal some farm household resource allocation decisions
at  the margin.
As with the pre-reform case,  it  is possible to cast  this new situation
7into the partial equilibrium context of traditional economic  theory.  In
what follows,  two polar cases are illustrated.  In  the  first instance,  it
is assumed that no significant sale  (or exchange) of ration coupons is
permitted among consumers;  it  is  effectively foreclosed by government
enforcement.  In the second instance,  it  is  assumed that a fluid and freely
functioning parallel market for  these coupons  exists alongside the
parallel grain market.  Reality is somewhere between these  two extremes  for
most places in today's China.  In both cases,  the analytical complications
of possible food grain imports or exports are  ignored for simplicity of
exposition.
Non-tradeable Ration Coupons
For this discussion,  it  is necessary to  alter both the demand and
supply sides of figure  1.  The demand side needs  to be altered to  consider
the demand for free market grain in the presence of non-tradeable ration
coupon entitlements and low state-enforced prices for the rationed
quantities.  The supply side needs to be altered to  take account of private
grain sales by farmers both to the  free market and to  the higher-priced
government purchasing track.
First consider the demand for food grain.  In the non-farm economy,
there are two major sub-groups of consumers,  those who have access  to
ration coupons for low-priced grain and those who do not.l/  Most people
who have no coupon entitlement are  rural residents who have moved away from
farms and villages,  permanently or  temporarily, to  seek employment in urban
areas as  transient workers.  Those who do have access to  coupons may be
further classified according to whether  they have fewer coupons than they
wish at prevailing state prices,  more than  they wish, or just  the right
8amount.  We will assume for simplicity here and later that,  aside  from
price considerations, consumers are  indifferent between obtaining grain at
state shops or  in the free market.
Representative  demand functions for non-farm consumers  in each of four
categories are illustrated in figure 2.  Panel  (a) of figure  2 shows a
demand function for free market grain by a representative consumer with no
access to coupons.  It  is  that individual's total demand for grain;  no
adjustment is  needed to account  for rationing.
Panel (b) indicates the demand for free market grain by someone with
insufficient coupons  at the official price.  The curve dd illustrates the
total demand for grain by this person,  q is the  individual's coupon
entitlement and Oa is  the official  state price for rationed grain.  For
this person,  Ob  is  the maximum demand price for the ration volume.  The
demand for free market grain for this  consumer is  indicated by the heavier
function d*d and is  constructed as  follows.
At free market grain prices lower than Oa, ration coupons would be
discarded,  and all purchases would be made in the  free market.  The free
market demand would lie along the total demand.  At free market prices
between Oa and Ob,  some additional quantities  of grain, beyond q, would be
desired namely the horizontal distance between dd and q at each price in
that interval.  At free market prices above Ob, no additional grain would
be purchased since the demand price for any unit of  grain along that
portion of dd exceeds both the ration price Oa and the maximum demand
price associated with q, namely Ob.  Hence,  d*d is  the free market demand
curve,  given q and Oa.
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FIGURE  2
Representative demand functions with
non-tradable coupons
10with exactly the correct amount of ration coupons given the official state
price of Oa.  The function d*d is  the appropriate free market demand in
this case.  No  additional amounts would be demanded at  free market prices
above Oa, and all ration coupons would be discarded at free market prices
below Oa.
Finally, panel  (d) shows the  free market demand function,  d*d, for an
individual with more than sufficient ration coupons at  the official price
of Oa.  Even if no free market existed,  this person would discard coupons
covering the volume cq at the state price of Oa.  At prices below Oa,  the
free market demand would coincide with total demand.  At open market prices
above Oa, no free market demand would exist since all grain needs could be
met with coupons at price Oa.
Next consider a horizontal summation of the demand functions  of all
consumers  from each of the four representative groups of figure 2.  The
total grain demand, shown in panel (b) of figure  3, is DD.  It  is  the  sum
of all dd functions.  The aggregate  free market demand, net of rationed
consumption,  is the heavier function D*D.  'The portion of D*D above  the
ration price of Oa is  the free market demand by consumers who have either
no  coupons at all or  insufficient coupons at price Oa.  The horizontal
segment,  sm, of D*D at Oa reflects  the potential replacement of ration
consumption with free market demand should the  free price equal or dip
slightly below Oa.
The quantity Q in panel (b) is  the total amount available through
rationed distribution.  At the price of Oa,  the quantity rs  represents the
amounted demanded in the  free market by those who have been issued no
coupons.  The quantity Or  is,  therefore,  the  free market quantity demanded
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12by those whose ration entitlement is  insufficient at the price of Oa.  At
the other extreme, the quantity mn is  the total amount,  if any, by which
some individuals'  ration entitlements  exceed their needs  at  the price of
Oa.
The supply side also needs to be reconsidered in the presence of a
parallel free market.  Panel  (a) of figure  3 is basically the same  as  the
supply side of figure 1.  The aggregate marginal cost curve of food grain
is  depicted as  SS,  and Q is the aggregate mandatory delivery quota.  Farm
households must deliver Q at, perhaps,  price Ob.2/ However,  they may sell
additional amounts privately on the open market.  If  the open market price
is  Oc or above,  they presumably will sell at least some volume on that
market.
The function S'S'  shown in panel  (b) is  the schedule of quantities
that will be supplied to  the open market at various prices above Oc by
profit-seeking farmers.  It is  the supply function of free market grain and
is  the horizontal difference between SS and Q.
The intersection of D*D and S'S'  determines the free market price,  Oe,
and the amount traded in that market, Ok, when (1) the ration price is  Oa
and (2) when Q is both the mandatory grain delivery by  farmers and the
amount available for  state distribution to consumers.  Farm revenue
accounted for by the open market is  the value Oefk in panel  (b).  Three
distinct grain prices emerge  in this setting--the  free market price of Oe,
the state-controlled consumption price  of Oa,  and the state-controlled
price paid to farmers for quota deliveries,  Ob.  The average per unit value
(price) of grain received by farmers  in this setting will be a weighted
average  of Od and Ob, where the weights are,  respectively,  the proportions
13of sales to the  free market and quota deliveries to  the state.  The average
price paid by consumers will be a weighted average of the free market price
and the official ration price with the weights being,  respectively,  the
proportions of purchases  in the free market and from rationed supplies.
With a parallel market for grain, the  free market price allocates both
farm production resources at the over-quota margin and marginal consumption
expenditures beyond the rationed volume.  With given supply conditions,  the
gap between the free market price and the official  ration price  is directly
linked to  the extent of excess  demand for grain beyond Q at various
prices.  The larger this  excess demand,  the wider this price gap will be.
Alexeev shows that  in a rationing environment based on queuing,  as  in  the
USSR, this  price difference is  linked directly to  the  time consumers expect
to  spend waiting in line for rationed volumes.  This  is equivalent to
measuring  the relative scarcity of ration coupons  in the Chinese context.
A currently realistic  situation can be identified in which the quota
amount procured from farms by the government is  less  than it  actually
obtains  for ration distribution and for other requirements such  as  stocks,
military use, exports,  etc.  In this  case,  the government essentially acts
as  part of the open market demand.  Its  over-quota demand can be regarded
as part of D*D  in much the  same  sense that panel  (a) of figure 2 represents
potential grain buyers who are wholly outside the ration system.  In this
case,  the state actually competes with the  free market for over-quota grain
supplies,  paying the over-quota price of Oe  in panel  (a) of figure 3.
Suppose,  for instance,  that the  quota procurement is  approximately
equal  to  ration requirements, but the government needs  an amount equal  to
Og in panel  (b) for other purposes.  It buys that additional amount at  the
14free market price of Oe,  thereby increasing government budgetary costs  in
the grain sector by the amount Oehg.  It may or may not recover those costs
from its eventual  disbursement of that volume.  Other free market
purchasers procure gk at the price of Oe.  It  is,  of course, possible for
the government to manipulate the  free market price to some extent by
increasing or decreasing its  open purchases  in that market.  However,  the
government can either purchase a given amount on the  free market or
manipulate the market price.  It cannot do both.
Naturally, many other interesting scenarios and situations can be
examined with the diagrams  in figure 3 or with suitable  shifts and
variations on them.  Recall that a key assumption in this particular
analysis  is  that ration coupons are not transferable among consumers.  Now
let us  look at the end of the spectrum where coupons can be freely sold,
purchased, or traded among consumers.
Tradeable Ration Coupons
In this case, we assume,  as before,  that ration coupons  are  issued to
individual consumers on administratively determined criteria.  However,  let
us now suppose that these coupons,  once  they are  issued,  can be legally
traded among the original recipients and others.  Now there is  a parallel
market for both grain and state-issued coupons.  This  is  tantamount to
assuming that retail grain itself can be bought and sold openly from one
individual  to  another, possibly including purchases from state ration shops
for private sale to others.  Thus,  the coupons become a vestige of the
earlier,  fully controlled distribution scheme;  here they are purely an
income transfer from the government to  the recipients.
No supply side changes from the previous example need be  introduced
15for this case.  The parallel grain marketing system is  still in place with
the government operating as  the  sole procurer of mandatory quotas and as
only one of several buyers in the legal,  open market.
Now consider how coupons might be traded among consumers.  Figure 4
shows  the partial equilibrium demand function, dd, of a representative
consumer who has been issued ration coupons equivalent to q.  Assume that
the official  rationing price in the state shops  is  Oa.  At this price,  the
consumer pictured here would like  to buy ak units of grain but is
restricted to  q at the official price.
Now imagine that a parallel  free market in grain exists  in which the
price for any and all buyers  is  Ob.  Facing an unfulfilled demand for grain
at the official  ration price,  this buyer would be willing to  offer coupon
holders money for their excess coupons as  long as  the  official price plus
the coupon exchange price does not exceed the  free market price.
Alternatively,  this  buyer would be willing to  enter the  free market for fg
units  of grain at the going price of Ob.  In the coupon market,  the
consumer in figure 4 could offer the maximum amount of gj  (in money)  for
each of fg units of coupons,  this being the difference between the state
price and the free market price.  The dark shaded area indicates  either the
value of coupons purchased or the equivalent additional expenditures on
free market grain above the official value.
Now suppose  that the  free market price was higher,  at Oc.  The
consumer pictured in figure 4 would be willing to offer a maximum of me
coupons for sale  as  long as  the per unit value of each coupon in the market
was at least eh.  This  is because the opportunity cost  of consuming any
part of q is  the  free market grain price.  As long as  this opportunity
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FIGURE  4
Representative  demand function with
tradable ration coupons
17cost of consumption is higher than the grain's value in use,  indicated by
the demand price along dd at each quantity,  the consumer would be willing
and eager either to sell coupons  to others or  to  resell grain purchased at
the official price in the higher-priced free market.  The diagonally shaded
area in figure 4 is  the value that would be earned by the consumer either
by selling excess coupons or by arbitraging me units  of grain between the
rationed market and the  free market.
These examples  illustrate  the idea that the ration coupon entitlement
with parallel open markets in both grain and coupons  is  essentially an
income transfer  from the government to  coupon recipients.  In general,
only part of that income  transfer will be utilized for grain consumption if
coupons can be traded.  The article by Edwards also  illustrates  these
points with indifference curve analysis.
As some coupon holders offer coupons or  grain for sale,  and as  some
consumers  enter the free market for coupons  or grain, the open market
price of grain will be subject  to change.  It will rise or  fall until  the
amount of grain supplied in the market  (rationed plus  free quantities)  is
equal  to the amount demanded.  Figure 5 shows how the  total grain market
will tend to  adjust to these two parallel open markets.
A
If only Q were available  in the retail market,  the grain price would
rise in the free market to Oc.  The rectangle acfe  is  the trading value of
the coupons  issued.  Some coupons will be bought and sold and some will be
used for grain by the recipients themselves.  All persons  in the system
will view the free market price of Oc as  the opportunity cost  of grain
consumption and will act accordingly.
The picture will change  if we allow farmers  to  respond to higher free
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FIGURE  5
Parallel grain markets with
tradable ration coupons
19A
market prices and sell output beyond Q into the  free market.  This market
supply function is  shown in figure 5 as  S'S'.  It is  the same construct as
in panel  (b) of figure 3 except that now it begins not from the vertical
axis but from a point on the vertical extension of Q.  That point is  the
minimum price at which additional output will be called forth beyond quota
A
deliveries.  In fact, S'S'  is  simply the upper portion,.  beyond Q, of the
basic marginal cost function SS  shown in panel (a) of figure 3.
A
Any added production, beyond Q, will tend to press down the free
market price,  to  Ob  in this  illustration.  This  is  the same price  that
would occur in a completely open market without quotas or  rationing.  The
A
total amount Og will be supplied and consumed of which Qg will be
quantities not covered by coupons.  Obviously,  the  free market price of Ob
will  lie between the official ration shop price  of Oa and Q's  full demand
price of Oc.  The  cross hatched area in figure 5 shows the  "rent" value of
the ration coupons.  It  is  the  total market value of income  transferred to
coupon recipients by the government.
Some Comparisons and Extensions
When there are  two parallel markets,  one for grain and one  for
coupons,  the free market equilibrium price will tend to be the same  as in
an uncontrolled market for that commodity.  When there  is  a parallel market
for grain but not for coupons,  the  free market price for grain will  tend to
be higher than if coupons are  tradeable.  This  is because there are persons
in the system who will demand additional  grain but have no  legal access  to
additional or, perhaps,  any coupons.  Those who have excess  coupons
relative  to their needs  cannot trade them legally.  Hence,  consumers as a
group probably would prefer a system with parallel markets for both grain
20and coupons.  This  is because free market prices are lower,  and the coupons
can be used either for food purchases or sold for money which then can be
used freely.  This  general conclusion is  similar  to  that suggested by both
Flowers and Stroup and by Edwards via different analytical routes.
On the other hand, farmers probably would prefer a parallel system in
which ration coupons are not tradeable.  Their free market sales would earn
A
more than otherwise,  and, presumably,  the prices paid to  them for Q would
not be affected.  This conclusion also echoes  the view of Flowers and
Stroup that producers will  favor schemes in which coupons  are not
tradeable.
Naturally, both consumers and farmers, as purely economic actors,
would prefer any system featuring one or more parallel free markets to a
system with none.  In China today,  the grain market can said to operate
someplace between these two theoretical extremes.  Coupon trading is not
strictly legal or encouraged, but it often occurs, without large  risk to
the  traders.
The question of coupon life has not been confronted in this static
analysis.  The  implicit assumption in the kind of reasoning used here  is
that the quantity variables represent amounts demanded, supplied,  traded,
or consumed per unit of time.  The reality of Chinese grain coupons  is that
they do not lapse once they are issued;  they can be used or  saved.  Where
ration coupon trading or saving is possible,  coupons become very similar to
money.  They can be used for low priced grain, traded for money or other
goods,  or  simply saved for future contingencies.  When, as  now,  there  is a
large  inventory of unused coupons held in private hands,  a widespread,
vested interest in the continued operation of the rationing system is
21created.  Anyone holding coupons has  a stake  in the  system.  Any strong
hint that the system were about to be discontinued or  that existing coupons
might not always be redeemable would likely cause a massive run on the
state-controlled grain market that could not be easily contained.
The  income effect of  the traditional coupon disbursement also has not
been explicitly considered but needs  to be recognized.  The various partial
equilibrium demand curves described in this paper are drawn on the basis of
a particular disposable income distribution which was assumed not to  change
within the context of the discussion.  The value of the coupon distribution
in use or  in exchange  is clearly an important part of the  income for urban
consumers.  Any change in this  distribution would affect the position of the
demand curves  in the price-quantity quadrant.  A cut in the distribution
would shift demand curves to the left, an increase would shift them to  the
right.  In addition,  rises  (or falls)  in the  free market price of grain
relative to  the state's  ration price would increase  (or decrease)  these
income equivalents with consequent effects on grain demand functions.
Concluding Comments
The basic aim of this paper has been to  illustrate  the nature of
China's grain policy with rather simple partial equilibrium ideas from
neoclassical economic theory.  An important distinction is made between the
strong central controls exercised before the economic reforms were begun in
the  late 1970's  and the increased, but not complete,  reliance on open
markets characterizing the  1980's.  The operation of a partial  free market
for grain in China can be viewed as  an example of pricing and allocation
under parallel markets with consumer rationing.
22The complex reality of grain production and distribution in China is
surely not exhausted by this  approach,  and it may be somewhat artificial to
bend that nation's arcane  grain system into this abstract setting.  Yet as
long as  economic reform and market forces play a role  in China's
agricultural and food policy,  these ideas will fit the  situation ever more
closely.
23FOOTNOTES
1.  This paper's approach to  consumer demand theory under rationing is
quite elementary.  It relies heavily on the partial equilibrium
context in which a function can be drawn between prices and aggregate
quantities demanded of a given product without the complexities of how
administratively determined ration entitlements, once  issued,
continually affect the shape and position of the  functions.  More
rigorous  treatments  of the theory of consumer  choice under rationing
are presented by writers  such as Tobin, Deaton, and Howard.  A very
useful 1974 article by Edwards illustrates  individual  consumer choice
under coupon rationing in circumstances similar  to  those posed in this
paper.
2.  Here we  ignore the effects of input subsidies  for fertilizer and
diesel fuel which are paid to farm households as  they deliver quota
grain to  the governments.  Such payments would lower  the SS  function
to the left of Q.
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